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I. Introduction 
  As part of standards-based educational reforms introduced over the past two decades, 
many states have implemented exit examinations that students must pass in order to earn high 
school diplomas. Advocates argue that such examinations create incentives for students to work 
at learning important cognitive skills. By certifying that high school graduates have mastered the 
state-defined academic content standards, the examinations may also increase the economic 
value of a high school diploma (Evers & Walberg, 2002). Opponents of these tests suggest that 
they put unnecessary stress on students and encourage them to drop out of high school. They also 
argue that such tests place the greatest burden on the very groups who are already struggling in 
the educational system, such as low-income and special needs students (Thomas, 2005; Jones, 
Jones, & Hargrove, 2003). Because high school graduation is associated with many positive life 
outcomes, the question of how high-stakes testing affects high school completion rates is 
important to educational policymakers. 
While past research has focused primarily on the overall effects of imposing high-stakes 
accountability on aggregate student outcomes, we look at the consequences of exit examinations 
on individual students within a high-stakes testing regime. Capitalizing on a natural experiment, 
we examine the causal impact of failing the statewide 10
th grade mathematics examination on the 
probability of on-time high school graduation. The natural experiment stems from the state’s 
practice each year of determining a minimum passing score, thereby dividing a continuous 
performance measure into two categories – pass and fail. We use a regression discontinuity 
methodology to examine the consequences of being assigned to each of these categories for 
  
students of similar proficiency near the cutoff. Our data come from Massachusetts, a state that 
has earned a national reputation for rigorous content standards and English Language Arts (ELA) 
and mathematics assessments that are well aligned to the standards, and whose students have 
made substantial progress under standards-based reform. Thus, we examine these effects for 
students under an existing high-stakes accountability system. 
An exit examination can prevent students from graduating from high school in three 
ways: fear of failing may cause them to drop out before taking the test; failing the examination 
may cause them to drop out before re-taking it; and failure to pass even after multiple attempts 
may prevent graduation.  We refer to these mechanisms as Fear of Failure, Discouragement, and 
Repeated Failure.   We conduct a variety of analyses to explore the extent to which each of these 
mechanisms affects academically struggling students. 
We find that, for equally able low-income, urban students near the cutoff, failing the 10
th 
grade mathematics exit examination – as opposed to passing it – reduces the probability of on-
time graduation by eight percentage points. In contrast, failing the test does not reduce the 
probability of on-time graduation for wealthier urban students or suburban students on the 
margin of passing. Thus, the combination of low family income and urban schooling makes 
students particularly susceptible to the effects of failing. Importantly, we cannot distinguish here 
between a negative effect of failing the examination and a positive effect of passing it – students 
who fail the test may be disappointed with their performance and drop out of school, while 
students who pass may be encouraged and persist in school. Regardless, the practice of dividing 
students with essentially the same ability into two categories by this dichotomous cut score has 
an impact on student outcomes; this effect poses an important challenge for urban districts. 
Furthermore, for a typical low-income urban student on the margin of passing the 8
th 
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grade mathematics examination, failing that test also reduces the probability of persisting 
through 10
th grade by three percentage points, providing some evidence that Fear of Failure may 
play a role in students’ decisions. Interestingly, we find that failing the 10
th grade ELA 
examination does not affect the probability of graduation for low-income urban students on the 
margin of passing. 
We supplement these causal conclusions with descriptive analyses that explore possible 
sources of these effects for urban students with low family income. Here, we focus on students 
who fail the mathematics exit examination when they first take it at the end of grade 10,  
exploring their persistence and success on retests. At each retest opportunity, more than 80% of 
students who fail continue to retake the test. Massachusetts students show remarkable 
persistence, but relatively few students exhaust all of their retest opportunities. Instead, of the 
students who fail and never pass the examination, nearly two-thirds stop taking retests and drop 
out of school, presumably because their poor test performance has discouraged them. Here, we 
find important differences for urban, low-income students compared to their suburban peers. 
Among students with the same initial test scores, low-income urban students who fail the 
statewide mathematics examination at the end of the 10
th grade are just as likely as suburban 
students to retake the test, but they are much less likely to pass on retest.  Differences in 
academic support could explain this pattern.    
In Section II, we provide a brief discussion of standards-based reforms, their 
development in Massachusetts, and past research on the effects of high-stakes testing. In Section 
III, we explain our data sources, measures, and analytic strategy. Here, we justify our ability to 
make causal claims from these data. In Section IV, we detail our main findings.  In Section V, 
we perform several sensitivity analyses to verify the robustness of our results. We conclude with 
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a discussion of our findings and the questions they raise for policy-makers.   
 
II. Background and Context 
Standards-Based Educational Reforms and High-Stakes Testing 
In the years since the 1983 publication of A Nation at Risk, the standards-based reform 
movement has gained momentum and exerted substantial influence on state and federal 
education policy. While the details of these reform efforts vary greatly from state to state, 
common components include specification of content standards in core academic subjects and 
regular testing to monitor student progress toward mastering these standards. In addition to 
developing accountability structures for schools, many states have begun attaching consequences 
for students to their performance on the state-wide examinations. Currently, 25 states have or are 
phasing in examinations, typically in English language arts (ELA) and mathematics, that high 
school students must pass in order to graduate (Center on Education Policy, 2007). In most 
states, including Massachusetts, students first take these exit examinations as 10
th graders. 
Students who fail typically have multiple opportunities to retake the examination before 
graduation. 
Critics of high-stakes examinations argue that they may lead some students to drop out of 
high school (Thomas, 2005; Jones, Jones, & Hargrove, 2003). A 1999 National Research 
Council report cites qualitative work suggesting that “graduation tests pose no threat to most 
students, but, among those who fail them, they increase a sense of discouragement and contribute 
to the likelihood of dropping out” (Heubert & Hauser, p. 175). Any policy that causes students to 
drop out of school has substantial consequences because high school graduation remains a 
gateway into better paying jobs and post-secondary education. Employers recognize and reward 
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the skills that college graduates possess, especially the ability to engage in non-routine problem-
solving and to communicate effectively (Levy & Murnane, 2004). Because it causes students to 
complete less education, dropping out also reduces students’ quality of life in a variety of 
dimensions, including reduced health, wealth, and happiness (Oreopoulos, 2007), increased 
criminality (Lochner & Moretti, 2004), and increased mortality rates (Lleras-Muney, 2005). 
Given the importance of high school completion and the possible negative consequences 
of high-stakes testing, many scholars have explored whether exit examinations reduce graduation 
rates. This work has taken two main forms: some researchers have examined the effect of 
imposing high-stakes testing on aggregate student outcomes, while others have focused on the 
relationship between an individual student’s performance on the test and that student’s 
probability of graduating in states with high-stakes testing regimes. 
Much early work examining aggregate outcomes used correlational evidence; Clarke, 
Haney, & Madaus (2000) review this literature and conclude that “high stakes testing programs 
are linked to decreased rates of high school completion.” Exploiting variation in exit examination 
policies across states and/or over time, some recent work provides at least tentative support for 
these correlational conclusions (Reardon & Galindo, 2002; Warren, Jenkins, & Kulick, 2006; 
Nichols, Glass & Berliner, 2006). In contrast, Carnoy & Loeb (2002), Greene & Winters (2004), 
and Carnoy (2005) find no relationship between state accountability policies, including high 
school exit examinations, and high school completion rates. Some recent work suggests that 
exploring aggregate patterns may obscure heterogeneity in effects for different groups of 
students. Dee and Jacob (2006) find increased dropout rates only for urban and minority 
students, while Jacob (2001) finds similar patterns only for the lowest achieving students.  
Research that examines the relationship between individual student performance on exit 
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examinations and high school completion remains much less common. Using data from the 
Florida Minimum Competency Test from 1987-91, Griffin & Heidorn (1996) find a relationship 
between student performance and drop-out rate only for students with high GPAs. While the 
authors control for selected student characteristics, the results cannot be interpreted causally 
because it is likely that students who fail the examination differ from those who pass in critical 
unobserved dimensions. Griffin & Heidorn also focus on the impact of a minimum competency 
test, which differs substantially from the current incarnation of state-mandated high school exit 
examinations. Cornell, Krosnik & Chang (2006) examine a group of students who were wrongly 
informed that they had failed the Minnesota high-stakes examination. Most of these students 
reported some negative academic impact of “failing” this test. 
Martorell (2005) provides causal estimates of the effect of failing a high school exit 
examination on high school graduation, using a regression discontinuity analysis similar to the 
one we employ in this paper. He finds no effect of failing the Texas exit examination on high 
school graduation for students who barely failed. This finding holds for every examination until 
the very last administration of a student’s senior year. As students run out of testing 
opportunities, failing the examination does prevent them from graduating because they cannot 
satisfy state requirements.  
We do not address the overall consequences of standards-based accountability in 
Massachusetts.  Instead, like Martorell (2005), we look at how this policy plays out in a state 
committed to standards-based reform. In other words, we look at the effects of dividing a 
continuous measure of student proficiency into two categories – pass and fail – at an arbitrary cut 
score. We extend Martorell’s research in several respects. Most importantly, we look for (and 
find) heterogeneous causal effects. In Massachusetts, examining only aggregate impacts masks a 
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substantial effect for low-income urban students; as a result, we focus our analyses on this group. 
Second, we examine additional mechanisms by which exit examinations may decrease high 
school graduation, including the possibility that students drop out even before taking the 10
th 
grade test. Third, we conduct descriptive analyses that shed light on the sources of the 
heterogeneous causal impacts.  Finally, we make use of data from a state quite different from 
Texas.  
The Massachusetts Context 
  In the 15 years since the Massachusetts legislature passed the Massachusetts Education 
Reform Act of 1993, the state has invested more than one billion dollars per year in additional 
funding for K-12 public education.  These investments have borne considerable fruit.  For 
example, a 2006 study by the Fordham Foundation praised the Massachusetts academic 
standards as the most rigorous in the country (Finn, Julian, & Petrilli, 2006).
1  A 2006 report by 
Education Week concluded that the state-wide tests used to assess the English language arts and 
mathematical skills of Massachusetts students (part of the Massachusetts Comprehensive 
Assessment System (MCAS)) were well aligned with the state’s demanding academic standards.  
While this report gave an average grade of B- to the standards and accountability systems 
developed by states, it gave the Massachusetts system an A (Quality Counts, 2006).   
Most importantly, Massachusetts students are doing well and have improved markedly on 
the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) examinations in recent years.  In 2007 
                                                 
1 This same Fordham Foundation report, The State of State Standards 2006, pointed out that the 
Massachusetts standards were exceptional.  In contrast, “two-thirds of schoolchildren in America 
attend class in states with mediocre (or worse) expectations for what their students should learn” 
(Finn, Julian, & Petrilli, 2006). 
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Massachusetts’ 4th graders ranked first nationwide on the NAEP reading and mathematics tests 
and second nationwide on the writing test.  The state's 8
th graders ranked first in mathematics, 
tied for first in reading, and third in writing on the NAEP tests (NCES, 2008).  Furthermore, 
since the introduction of state testing under standards-based reform, the state’s NAEP 
performance has improved rapidly. As Figure 1 shows, Massachusetts 8
th graders not only far 
exceed the national average, but their performance has increased much more rapidly than the 
national average. Thus, it is in the context of a system that has brought about significant 
accomplishments that we examine the consequences for students of failing the MCAS 
examination. 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
  Massachusetts began administering the MCAS mathematics and ELA examinations in 
1998.  For the class of 2003, the 10
th grade tests became high-stakes exit examinations. Students 
must pass both tests in order to receive a high school diploma.
2 The state allows students to take 
the tests without time constraints and to retake them repeatedly if they fail, attempting explicitly 
to make the MCAS as minimal a barrier to graduation as possible.
3 Critics, however, claim that 
even with these safeguards, the examinations do indeed prevent students from graduating.   
                                                 
2 As the state imposed high stakes on the MCAS for students, student performance has risen 
dramatically. The overall passing rate jumped from 49% to 68% in the year of the policy shift. 
Currently, 87% of students pass the test. The state estimates that this effect represents 
approximately a 0.5 standard deviation increase in student test performance simply as a result of 
imposing the requirement to pass (Conaway, personal communication, 2008). 
3 The state has a performance appeals process in place that allows students to demonstrate their 
proficiency in alternate ways. It also offers alternative assessments to certain students. Only 314 
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Of the nearly 70,000 students who took the 8
th grade mathematics examination in 2002, 
76% went on to graduate on time in Massachusetts in 2006. We can partition those students who 
did not graduate on time into two groups – those who did not persist to take the 10
th grade 
examination (9%) and those who took the 10
th grade test but did not graduate two years later 
(15%). Thus, most students who did not graduate left the system after taking the 10
th grade 
examination.  We focus first on this population and return to the group who dropped out before 
10
th grade later in the paper. 
That students who passed the 10
th grade MCAS examination on their first attempt 
graduate at greater rates than students who fail is not surprising – all students must pass the test 
to graduate. Of the 66,347 students in the 2006 graduating cohort who took the 10
th grade MCAS 
mathematics examination for the first time in 2004, 87% passed on their first try.  However, 
students who failed faced substantial risk of dropping out: only 50% of them went on to graduate 
on time, compared to 90% of the students who passed. 
While striking, this descriptive pattern does not confirm that the exit examinations pose a 
barrier to graduation. A student’s MCAS scores are associated with a variety of other 
characteristics, such as academic proficiency, motivation, and access to educational resources, 
that also affect their probability of graduation. As a result, we would expect students who fail the 
examination to drop out at greater rates, even in the absence of any testing requirement. The 
direct relationship between MCAS score and the graduation rate among students who did pass 
the 2004 test provides evidence for this conclusion. Among these students, 73% who just passed 
                                                                                                                                                             
of the state’s 57,000 graduates in 2006 satisfied the requirement using either of these two 
alternative routes.  
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graduated on time, compared to 98% of students with a perfect score.
4 Thus, a challenge in our 
current study involves disentangling the effects of failing the examination from the effects of 
student ability and other background characteristics related to test performance. 
Conceptually, we would like to take students who scored identically, right at the pass/fail 
cut score, and randomly assign them to either a “pass” or a “fail” condition. This assignment 
process would render them equivalent in expectation on all observable and unobservable 
characteristics prior to treatment, allowing us to identify any differences in the ultimate outcome 
(high school graduation) as a causal effect of simply failing the examination, rather than of 
earning lower scores. Such an experiment is, of course, both impossible and unethical. However, 
we can take advantage of the state’s exogenous imposition of a minimum passing score to 
provide a natural experiment from which we can draw equivalent causal conclusions. By 
examining students with nearly identical MCAS performance, but just on either side of this 
exogenously-assigned cutoff, we can interpret any differences in their graduation outcomes as 
the causal effect of failing the examination for these students “on the margins” of passing 
(Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002).  
Research Questions
We first examine the effect of failing the 10
th grade examination, paying particular 
attention to impacts on low-income, urban students. We then attempt to explore the Fear of 
Failing effect that may arise as students predict they will not pass the 10
th grade test and drop out 
                                                 
4 For scores above the passing standard, the estimated correlation between the raw MCAS 
mathematics score and the proportion of students who graduate on time is 0.965, suggesting a 
very strong positive linear relationship between MCAS performance and probability of on-time 
high school completion. 
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before even taking it. We cannot identify this effect cleanly, but we can get some sense of its 
magnitude by examining student performance on the 8
th grade test. Finally, we look at students 
who fail their 10
th grade test, examining their persistence and success on retests. We explore 
whether students who fail and drop out do so because of Discouragement (students give up and 
drop out after failing one or more of the examinations) or through Repeated Failure (after 
exhausting the available retest opportunities, students still have not satisfied the testing 
requirements). Specifically, we address three primary research questions: 
RQ1. Does failing the high school exit examination as a 10
th grader make students on the 
margin of passing less likely to graduate from high school on time? 
RQ2. Among students who fail the 10
th grade exit examination and do not graduate, is the 
primary mechanism one of Discouragement or Repeated Failure?  
RQ3. Does failing the 8
th grade test cause students on the margin of passing to drop out 
before taking the 10
th grade examination? 
 
 
III. Research Design 
Data Sources 
The Massachusetts Department of Education has compiled a comprehensive database that 
tracks students longitudinally throughout high school, allowing for clear description of student 
graduation outcomes. For the 2006 graduating cohort, the records contain each student’s MCAS 
mathematics and ELA test results, demographic characteristics, and status at cohort graduation, 
including whether the student graduated, dropped out, is still enrolled, transferred out, was 
expelled, or any of eleven possible outcomes. This dataset allows for much more precise 
estimation of the probability of high school completion than do previous studies, and it permits 
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investigation of the direct link between student performance on high-stakes tests and graduation 
outcomes at the individual level.  
Our dataset includes 83,892 student records from across the state of Massachusetts. To 
analyze the effect of failing the 10
th grade examination (our first research question), we focus on 
members of the 2006 graduating cohort who first took the 10
th grade mathematics MCAS 
examination as sophomores in 2004 and for whom the examination was a high-stakes test. This 
sample includes students who entered the state between 8
th and 10
th grade and consequently 
missed the 8
th grade examination.   Our final sample for addressing the first research question 
includes 66,347 students.
5 For our third research question, we use the 69,127 students in the 
same cohort who took the 8
th grade mathematics examination. This sample includes students 
who dropped out of school before 10
th grade. 
 
Measures
To address our first research question, we created a dichotomous outcome variable, 
named GRAD, that indicates whether the student graduated from a Massachusetts high school in 
Massachusetts in 2006 (1=graduated on-time in Massachusetts; 0 otherwise). Districts report the 
values of individual student graduation outcomes to the Department of Education using the 
state’s Student Information Management System (SIMS). Note that students can be coded as zero 
                                                 
5 The state identifies slightly fewer than 3,000 students (less than 5% of the total sample) who 
are not in the “final 2006 cohort,” meaning that they moved out of the state before high school 
graduation. Using only the 63,361 individuals in the “final cohort” does not alter our results. We 
include the full sample to account for any effects the high-stakes examination has on student 
mobility. 
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either for dropping out of school, for moving out of state before graduation, or for continuing in 
high school without graduating. In Section V, we explore the sensitivity of our results to this 
outcome definition. We created several additional outcome variables for the descriptive analyses 
that we used to address our second research question.  For students who failed the examination, 
we created dichotomous outcomes that indicate whether the student retook the test (RETAKE) 
and whether they passed this retest (RETAKE_PASS). Finally, to address our third research 
question, we created another dichotomous outcome measure, named TAKE10th, that indicates 
whether a student who took the 8
th grade mathematics examination persisted in school to take the 
10
th grade test (1=persisted to take the test; 0 otherwise).   
The dataset contains a record of scores from every MCAS mathematics and ELA 
examination that each student took from 8
th grade
6 through high school graduation. The state 
reports raw scores, scaled scores, and performance level for each test. A scaled score of 220 
qualifies as passing, with a different performance rating each 20 points, as follows: (a) 200 to 
218: Failing, (b) 220 to 238: Needs Improvement, (c) 240 to 258: Proficient, and (d) 260 to 280: 
Advanced. Since multiple raw scores translate to a single scaled score, we use raw scores in our 
analyses in order to preserve fine-grained performance differences on the test.
7 For the 10
th grade 
mathematics examination, raw scores ranged from 0 to 60; students who earned more than 20 
                                                 
6 Technically, students took the middle school ELA examination in 7
th grade and the 
mathematics examination in 8
th grade. For simplicity, we refer to these examinations as the “8
th 
grade” tests.   
7The state reports reliabilities of 0.92 for mathematics and 0.89 for ELA. For more information 
on MCAS scoring and scaling, see the MCAS Technical Reports (MA DOE, 2002, 2005). 
  13 
points passed the test.
8 To implement our regression discontinuity approach, we centered 
students’ raw scores by subtracting out the value of the corresponding minimum passing score. 
On these re-centered continuous predictors, MATH and ELA, a student with a score of zero had 
achieved the minimum passing score. We also created a dichotomous predictor, PASS, to 
indicate whether the student passed the examination (1=student passed; 0 otherwise).  
The dataset also includes the values of several key control predictors, such as student race 
and gender as well as dichotomous variables indicating whether the student was classified as 
limited English proficient (LEP), special education (SPED), low-income (LOWINC), attending a 
high school in one of Massachusetts’s 22 urban school districts (URBAN), or appearing in the 
10
th grade sample without an 8
th grade test score (NEWSTUDENT).
9 Each of these indicators is 
coded 1 for those who belong to the category, and 0 otherwise. Overall, 26% of the students 
attended urban schools and 28% of students were identified as low income. Low-income students 
tended to cluster in urban schools: 63% of urban students lived in poverty, compared to just 16% 
of suburban students. 
Data Analyses
We address our first and third research questions by conducting identical regression 
discontinuity analyses with the relevant outcome variable.  We describe below the analyses that 
we use to address our first research question, which concerns the impact of just failing the 10th 
                                                 
8 For the 8
th grade mathematics test, students had to score 22 points to pass, and for the 10
th 
grade ELA examinations the minimum passing score was 39. 
9 Some of these students moved into the state after 8
th grade, while others simply had missing 8
th 
grade test scores. Because we cannot distinguish between these two groups, we cannot interpret 
this variable as a pure indicator of new students to the state. 
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grade mathematics examination on the probability of on-time high school graduation. To explore 
whether just failing the 8th grade mathematics test reduces persistence to 10th grade (our third 
research question), we replace outcome GRAD by outcome TAKE10th. 
Under conditions that we discuss below, we can analyze data from our natural experiment 
– using the regression discontinuity strategy first proposed by Thistlethwaite & Campbell (1960) 
– to make such causal inferences for students at the margins of passing.
10  Because the 
probability that a student passes the examination goes unequivocally from zero to one at a single 
cut score, the discontinuity is sharp. 
The internal validity of our regression discontinuity analyses – and consequently our 
ability to make unbiased causal inferences about the impact of exit examinations – relies on 
several critical assumptions about the relationship between student MCAS score and graduation. 
Later in the paper we describe our efforts to verify that these assumptions are fulfilled.  If so, the 
magnitude of the discontinuity in the outcome provides an unbiased estimate of the causal impact 
of failing the examination for students at the cut score. Thus, we obtain an estimate of the 
average treatment effect for students on the margin of passing. 
We estimate the effect of failing the examination as a difference in the probability of on-
time graduation between students scoring at the cutoff who just passed ( pass γ ) and just failed 
( fail γ ).
11 In our analyses, we use observations above the cut score to estimate  pass γ  and 
observations below the cut score to estimate  fail γ . Because we do not know the precise 
functional form of the relationship between MCAS score and the probability of graduation, we 
                                                 
10 For a more detailed description of the regression discontinuity approach see Shadish, Cook, & 
Campbell (2002). 
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model this continuous relationship using a nonparametric smoothing process to estimate  pass γ  
and fail γ . A further complication arises as our parameters of interest –  pass γ  and  fail γ  – are 
estimated at boundary points. As standard nonparametric smoothing strategies have poor 
boundary properties, Hahn, Todd, & Van der Klaauw (2001) recommend estimating these limits 
with local linear regression.
12  
Our implementation of nonparametric smoothing using local linear regression follows 
closely the recommendations of Imbens and Lemieux (2007).
13 We conduct our nonparametric 
smoothing within a linear probability specification of the standard regression discontinuity 
design. Specifically, at each MCAS score point, we estimate a linear regression function using 
only observations within a narrow bandwidth, h, around the point to predict the probability of 
graduation for each observation. As we move this bandwidth through our data range, we 
therefore generate locally predicted values at each MCAS score point; linking these estimates 
together creates the requisite smoothed nonparametric regression line. Here, the extent of the 
smoothing depends on the choice of bandwidth, h. Because we can only make causal claims 
about the effect of failing for students at the cut score, in our later analyses we focus attention on 
the single locally-linear regression analysis that centers on the cut score and estimates  pass γ  
and fail γ . In this regression, then, we use only observations within bandwidth h on either side of 
the cut score, as follows:
14
                                                 
12 Fan (1992) shows that, unlike most nonparametric smoothing techniques, local linear 
regression does not require boundary modifications. 
13 Ludwig and Miller (2007) use a similar strategy.  Our approach differs in our choice of a 
rectangular rather than a triangular kernel for the non-parametric smoothing; however, Imbens & 
Lemieux (2007) argue that “more sophisticated kernels rarely make much difference” (p. 16) and 
instead recommend assessing robustness to different bandwidth choices, as we do in Section V. 
14 We estimate robust (Huber-White) standard errors to account for both the clustering of 
students within schools and heteroscedasticity in the dichotomous outcome. 
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() ( ) i i i i i i MATH PASS PASS MATH GRAD p ε β β β β + × + + + = = 3 2 1 0 1    (1) 
for the i
th individual. While our nonparametric smoothing approach does not, by definition, 
return parameter estimates,
15 we can interpret the estimates from this single locally-linear fit in 
(1); these estimates represent the instantaneous slopes and intercepts for students at the cut score. 
In this model, parameter  fail pass γ γ β − = 2  represents the causal effect of passing the 10
th grade 
MCAS mathematics examination on the population probability of on-time high school 
graduation for students at the cut score. If its estimated value is statistically significant and 
positive, then we know that classifying a student as passing the high-stakes test at the cut score, 
as opposed to failing it, causes the student’s probability of graduating from high school to 
increase discontinuously. 
Our nonparametric procedure requires that we choose a suitable bandwidth, h, for the 
smoothing procedure and consequently for defining the region around the discontinuity in which 
we fit and interpret the model in (1). In our analyses, we select an optimal bandwidth, h*, using 
all of our data by applying the cross-validation procedure described by Imbens & Lemieux 
(2007). Essentially, this procedure determines the bandwidth that minimizes the mean squared 
error in the predicted boundary points, leading to an optimal tradeoff of bias and precision for the 
estimation of  pass γ  and  fail γ .
16 In our analyses, we obtain an optimal bandwidth of between four 
                                                 
15 For example, the overall relationship between MCAS score and probability of graduation 
cannot be represented by a single slope throughout the data range. 
16 In other words, we determine a predicted probability of graduation  for each 
observation i using only observations within h points to the left of MCAS
)) ( ˆ ( h AD R G i
i for students who failed 
and to the right of MCASi for students who passed the examination. We determine the mean 
squared error of these predictions across the entire sample. We then systematically vary the 
bandwidth, h, choosing as h* the value of h that minimizes this mean squared error. More 
formally, h* = arg  ∑ −
=
N
i
i i GRAD h AD R G
1
2
h
) ) ( ˆ (
N
1
  min . Because our ultimate objects of interest are 
the parameter estimates at the cut score, Imbens & Lemieux recommend excluding observations 
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and six raw score points depending on the model specification, as indicated below. However, in 
sensitivity analyses described in Section V, we show that our main conclusions are robust to the 
choice of bandwidth. 
  We extend this simple model in several ways. First, we include a vector of selected 
student background covariates (Xi) to improve precision and to eliminate small sample biases 
that result from including observations not immediately at the cut score (Imbens & Lemieux, 
2007). Second, because our primary outcome is a dichotomous predictor that indicates whether 
the student graduates from high school on time, we replicate our analysis by specifying the 
probability of on-time high-school graduation as a logistic function of predictors. Here, we limit 
our analysis to those observations that fall within a narrow window around the cut score. For 
consistency with our earlier nonparametric smoothing, we choose a window whose width 
extends the optimal bandwidth of h* on either side of the cut score. Again, we systematically 
vary this window width in Section V in order to test the robustness of our findings.
17  
Finally, we also examine the impact of test failure on high school graduation for 
particular groups of students, including urban students from low-income families. We do this in 
two ways. First, we add all possible interactions between predictors PASSi, MATHi, LOWINCi, 
and URBANi, up to and including the four-way interaction among the predictors, to our 
regression equation in (1). Second, we fit separate regressions for each subgroup. As we find 
nearly identical results, we present this more parsimonious approach. Again, our main results 
                                                                                                                                                             
in the tails from the cross-validation determination. As data are less dense in the tails, including 
these observations may lead to over-smoothing. As a result, we eliminate the 10% of the 
observations on either side of, and most remote from, the cutoff.  
17  In preliminary analyses, we investigated whether higher-order non-linear polynomial 
specifications of MATH score were required within the logistic model, including quadratic and 
cubic polynomial specifications. These specifications did not lead to improvements in model fit, 
within the narrow regression discontinuity window that we have selected for the analysis, and so 
we present results from the more parsimonious linear specification here. 
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here derive from a single local linear regression analysis that incorporates only observations 
within an optimal bandwidth, h*, on either side of the cut-off.  
For two reasons we focus on the statistically significant impact of just passing/failing the 
MCAS mathematics test on high school graduation for low-income urban youth.  First, the 
educational challenges facing these students have received national attention. Consequently, 
understanding the impact of high-stakes testing on the academic prospects for struggling low-
income urban students is especially relevant to educational policy formulation. Second, the data 
currently available to us are insufficient to support exploration of other interesting questions, 
such as the effect of just failing the 10
th grade MCAS test on urban special education students. 
We plan to examine additional subgroup effects in future research after we have increased our 
sub-sample sizes by pooling data across multiple graduation cohorts. 
To address our second research question, we conduct analyses in which we explore why 
failing the 10
th grade MCAS mathematics test reduces the probability of high school graduation 
for low-income urban students, but not for their wealthier or suburban peers. However, we 
interpret these results only descriptively because the additional analyses cannot support unbiased 
causal inference. In these descriptive analyses, we explore patterns of test-taking persistence and 
success for students who fail, in order to see whether low-income urban students are less likely 
than wealthier or suburban students to retake the examination or to pass their first retest. Here, 
we fit probit models of the following form on the sample of students who failed the 10
th grade 
mathematics examination: 
i i
i i i i i i
ELA PASS
ELA MATH URBAN LOWINC URBAN RETAKE
X α′ + +
+ + + × + =
~ _                         
) (
5
4 3 2 1 0
β
β β β β β
      (2) 
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for the i
th student.
18 In our model, our principal research interest focuses on the parameter sum, 
β1+β2, which represents the difference between low-income urban students and suburban 
students in the probability of retaking the test. By including mathematics and ELA test scores 
and whether the student passed the ELA examination in the model, we explicitly compare 
students with the same proficiency on both the mathematics and ELA examinations.  
We conduct similar analyses to examine retesting success, replacing the outcome 
RETAKEi with RETAKE_PASSi. One challenge with this approach involves the differential 
effects of measurement error on retest success for low-income, urban students and their suburban 
peers who fail.
19 For these analyses, we use a truncated sample that generates estimates of retest 
success conditional on having failed the examination. Because the passing score is further at the 
tail of the distribution for suburban students than for urban, low-income students,
20 suburban 
students who fail are more likely than low-income, urban students to have performed so poorly 
on the test merely by chance. As a group, then, suburban students who fail are likely to do better 
mechanically on the retest than low-income, urban students, regardless of any increase in true 
proficiency. In other words, truncating our sample to focus on students who failed their first 
examination induces a correlation between the error term and our indicators of group 
membership, preventing us from obtaining unbiased estimates of β1. Simulation results, 
presented in Appendix A, confirm that suburban students will outperform low-income, urban 
                                                 
18 In preliminary analyses, we found that low-income and wealthier suburban students were 
indistinguishable from one another in terms of their probability of retaking the examination or of 
passing their first retest.  By omitting the main effect of dichotomous predictor LOWINCi from 
the hypothesized model, we implicitly treat all suburban students, regardless of family income, 
as the reference group. 
19 The authors thank Steven Rivkin for pointing out this issue and for his helpful suggestions for 
addressing it. 
20 The passing score is at the 32
nd percentile for urban, low-income students but just the 9
th 
percentile for suburban students. 
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students on the retest mechanically, without any difference in true proficiency. As recommended 
by Hanushek & Rivkin (2006), we resolve this issue by exploiting the fact that the mathematics 
and ELA test administrations occur on different days and measurement error on the two tests is 
uncorrelated. Given the strong correlation between mathematics and ELA performance, we use 
10
th grade ELA scores to instrument for 10
th grade mathematics scores and adopt a two-stage 
least squares estimation strategy. This approach breaks the link between measurement error and 
group membership. Simulation results suggest that this approach successfully resolves the issue 
(see Appendix A). 
 
IV. Findings 
(1) Effect of failing the high-stakes exit examination on high school graduation  
 Passing  the  10
th grade MCAS mathematics examination increases the probability that a 
low-income, urban student on the margin of passing will graduate from high school on-time by 
eight percentage points (p=0.015). Given that 26% of low-income, urban students who just pass 
the exam do not graduate on time, this effect is quite substantial. We find no such effects for 
wealthier urban students or for suburban students, regardless of family income. Thus, it is the 
interaction of low family income and an urban environment that appears to render students, on 
average, more susceptible to the effects of failing. In Table 1, we present parameter estimates 
and approximate p-values from our local linear regression analyses using observations that fall 
within our “optimal” window of h* on either side of the cut score. Models 1a and 1b present our 
findings for all students from equation (1), with time-invariant student demographic controls, by 
subgroup. 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
  21 
To interpret the estimates presented in Table 1 more easily, we present the fitted 
nonparametrically smoothed relationship between graduation and MCAS mathematics score for 
low-income urban students from our preferred specification in Figure 2.
21 For these low-income 
urban students at the margin, passing the examination substantially increases their subsequent 
probability of graduation. Visually, this effect appears as an interruption in the underlying 
smooth relationship between the probability of graduation and the MCAS mathematics score at 
the cut score. For perspective, we have included the sample mean probabilities of on-time 
graduation at each MCAS score level. 
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
The effects for wealthier urban and suburban students are not statistically significant. 
However, the point estimates indicate that wealthier students on the margins of passing who just 
fail have a slightly greater probability of on-time graduation than students who just pass. This 
seemingly counterintuitive pattern could stem from efforts by schools with ample resources to 
focus attention on the relatively few students with failing MCAS scores. Recent research by Neal 
and Schanzenbach (2007) lends some support for this claim; the authors find that, in the Chicago 
Public Schools, teachers face and respond to incentives to focus instruction on students who 
seem likely to improve their performance on the high-stakes examination. 
(2) Persistence and success in retesting among students who fail
  Overall, the 8,269 students who failed the mathematics MCAS on their first try in 2004 
showed remarkable persistence in retaking the examination. Nearly 89% took the examination at 
least one more time and, of these students, 68% went on to pass the test at some point in high 
                                                 
21 We can also recover the fitted relationship between graduation and MCAS mathematics score 
for the three other categories of students (wealthier urban, low-income suburban, and wealthier 
suburban). However, as our analyses show no effects on these groups, we decide to focus on the 
relationship for low-income urban students. 
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school. On average, students who never passed the examination retook it twice before giving up. 
As the sample histogram in Figure 3 illustrates, on each retest, approximately 35% of the 
students passed. Among those who failed each retest, most students (85 to 90 percent) decided to 
retake it yet another time. Although not shown, the numbers of students pursuing retests declines 
precipitously after the fourth retest: only 113 students retook the examination a fifth time, and 
only 7 took a sixth retest. Thus, very few students took advantage of all retest opportunities.  
FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
Among students who failed their first test, we find evidence for both Discouragement and 
Repeated Failure. Here, we examine students whose initial test scores placed them within one 
bandwidth below the cut score but who never pass a retest. More than two-thirds of these 
students stop taking retests at some point and do not attempt the March 2006 examination, the 
last retest before the cohort’s graduation. Presumably, these students become discouraged and 
dropped out of school. However, one-third of these students persist to the March 2006 retest. 
Over 85% of these students have taken at least four retests, showing remarkable persistence. For 
these students, Repeated Failure appears to be the mechanism at play as they exhaust all of their 
retest opportunities but cannot satisfy the graduation requirement. These patterns support the 
Massachusetts Department of Education’s claim that most students have ample opportunities to 
retake the examination.  
Table 2 includes parameter estimates and approximate p-values from fitting the models 
specified in equation (2) to predict the probability that students who failed the 10
th grade 
mathematics examination retake and pass the first retest. In Figure 4, we present the fitted 
probability of retaking the examination (top panel) and passing the first retest (bottom panel) as a 
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function of initial mathematics test score.
22  Figure 4 illustrates that, among students with the 
same predicted MCAS scores on the initial tests, low-income urban students are no less likely 
than suburban students to retake the mathematics examination. However, low-income urban 
students are nearly ten percentage points less likely to pass this retest than suburban students 
with the same initial scores (p<0.001).  
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE 
(3) Effect of failing the 8
th grade examination on persistence to 10
th grade
  Although the 8
th grade examination does not carry high stakes for students, performance 
on the test is clearly related to the probability that students remain in school through 10
th grade. 
We present results in Table 3 from a regression discontinuity analysis of this outcome. For low-
income urban students on the margin of passing the 8
th grade mathematics test, failing reduces 
the probability of continuing in school and taking the 10
th grade MCAS examination by three 
percentage points (p=0.16). While this effect is not statistically significant in the model estimated 
with optimal bandwidth, we arrive at nearly identical, but more precise and statistically 
significant results using a slightly larger bandwidth. Because only eleven percent of low-income 
urban students who just pass the examination leave the system before 10
th grade, this three 
percentage point decline is noteworthy.  In Figure 5, we illustrate this pattern by plotting the 
fitted nonparametrically smoothed relationship between persistence to 10
th grade and 
mathematics score for low-income urban students, indicating that the probability of persisting 
jumps at the cut score between Passing and Failing.  
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
                                                 
22 In the bottom panel, we use predicted math score because of the IV approach used for this 
analysis. 
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FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE 
 (4) Effect of failing the English language arts examination on high school graduation
23
  Inspecting raw data in Massachusetts suggests that the mathematics examination is a 
larger hurdle to on-time graduation than the ELA examination. Most students who failed the 10
th 
grade ELA examination also failed the mathematics test, while among students who only failed 
one of the tests, three times as many failed mathematics as ELA. The ELA examination proves 
interesting, however, because detected patterns differ from the mathematics results. Failing the 
10
th grade ELA examination does not reduce the probability of graduation for low-income, urban 
students (or for another group of students) on the margin of passing. In Table 4, we present 
parameter estimates and approximate p-values from our local linear regression analyses, again 
using only observations that fall within our “optimal” window, centered on the cut score. We 
illustrate the relationship between ELA score and probability of graduation for low-income urban 
students in Figure 6. Here, the figure displays no discontinuous jump in the probability of 
graduating at the cut score, suggesting that failing the ELA examination does not affect students’ 
likelihood of on-time graduation.  
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE 
 
V. Sensitivity Analyses 
  As discussed above, for regression discontinuity analyses to identify a causal effect of 
failing the MCAS examinations on student graduation, several assumptions must hold. First, the 
                                                 
23 Because the middle school ELA test for the 2006 cohort occurred in 7
th grade, one year earlier 
than the mathematics test, the state data system, which began in 2001, cannot match students as 
accurately for this test. As a result, we cannot examine the effects that Fear of Failing the ELA 
examination may have on persistence to 10
th grade. 
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rule that determines whether a student has passed or failed the examination must be exogenous 
and rigidly applied across all students, while all other observed and unobserved characteristics of 
the student must vary smoothly and continuously around the cut score. Second, the relationship 
linking the probability of graduation and test score must be estimated accurately in the 
immediate vicinity of the cut score. In this section, we address these two primary concerns and 
describe other sensitivity analyses that we conduct to assess the robustness of our results. 
Exogenous Establishment of Cut Scores
  The cut scores established by the Massachusetts Department of Education serve as an 
extremely plausible source of exogenous variation and do indeed produce a sharp discontinuity 
in treatment. Because the raw score needed to pass the examination differs from year to year and 
is only calculated after students take examination, it seems highly unlikely that students could 
decide knowingly to fall just above, or just below, the cut score. Furthermore, the state DOE 
imposes these performance labels strictly, so that any student with a score of 20 points on the 
2004 administration of the 10
th grade mathematics examination failed, while any student with a 
score of 21 points passed.  Thus, the discontinuity is both exogenous and sharp. 
We performed several additional tests to verify the exogeneity of the MCAS cut score, as 
recommended by Imbens & Lemieux (2007). We examined a histogram of the 10
th grade 
mathematics scores to explore continuity around the cut score. We find that 899 students just 
failed the exam, while 900 just passed it. We also examined histograms of other covariates not 
affected by the examination to identify any apparent discontinuities around the cut score and 
found none. Finally, we split our sample into students who passed and students who failed in 
order to estimate effects at “pseudo-discontinuities” declared at the median mathematics scores 
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of these subsamples. In all cases, we find no reasons to doubt the robustness of our findings.
24
Accurate estimation of the relationship between graduation and MCAS mathematics score 
For estimates of the treatment effect to be unbiased, we must predict credibly and 
precisely what the probability of graduation would have been for students who failed the MCAS 
mathematics examination if they had scored 21 points on the test. We address this issue by 
modeling the smooth relationship between the probability of graduation and test score 
nonparametrically, using a local linear regression approach. Here, our primary specification 
decision then involves the choice of bandwidth, h. Our preferred models use optimal bandwidths 
chosen through the cross-validation procedures described above. 
To explore the sensitivity of our results to differences in bandwidth selection, we vary it 
systematically, refitting our principal smoothed nonparametric models in each case. In the top 
panel of Table 5, we present the fitted effects of failing the 10
th grade mathematics examination 
on on-time graduation for each subgroup as a function of different bandwidths. In the middle and 
bottom panels of Table 5, we present parallel results for the effects of failing the 8
th grade 
examination on persistence to 10
th grade and for the effects of failing the 10
th grade ELA 
examination on on-time high school graduation. Regardless of bandwidth, our main results are 
unchanged – for urban, low income students, failing the 8
th grade mathematics examination 
reduces the probability of persisting to 10
th grade and failing the 10
th grade mathematics 
examination reduces the probability of on-time graduation. However, we find no effects for other 
groups of students or for any group failing the 10
th grade ELA examination. Our estimates for the 
effect of failing the 8
th grade examination for marginal urban students range from 2.7 to 3.7 
percentage points, and are quite insensitive to bandwidth.  Our estimates of the effect of failing 
                                                 
24 The results of these analyses are available from the authors upon request 
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the 10
th grade examination range from 5.8 to 13.1 percentage points. In all cases, we reject the 
null hypothesis that the parameter value is zero.    
TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
  Finally, we explore the sensitivity of the results to the choice of functional form for the 
relationship between probability of on-time graduation and MCAS mathematics score.  As an 
alternative to our smoothed nonparametric specification, we fit logistic regression models that 
incorporate only observations in selected narrow “windows” around the MCAS cutoff. The top 
panel of Table 6 contains the critical predicted logistic regression coefficients and standard errors 
from models in which we estimate the impact of failing the 10
th grade mathematics examination 
on the probability of on-time graduation.  To facilitate interpretation, the bottom panel contains 
estimates in probability units of the causal impact of failing on the fitted probability of on-time 
graduation for a typical student. The results from the logistic regression analysis mirror almost 
identically those provided by our nonparametric approach. 
     T A B L E   6   A B O U T   H E R E  
Definition of outcome variable
  We choose to present our main analyses using on-time graduation as our primary 
outcome measure. However, one concern is that students who fail the MCAS may remain in 
school and graduate in subsequent years, or that they may drop out and earn a General 
Equivalency Diploma instead of graduating from high school. We find that our results are quite 
robust to the definition of our outcome. Here, we use three different outcome measures: 
graduated on-time or still enrolled in school; dropped out; graduated on-time or obtained a GED. 
As seen in Table 7, in all cases we find statistically significant effects of passing the examination 
ranging from 7.2 to 9.1 percentage points.  
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TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE 
VI. Discussion  
  This paper addresses several important questions about the effects of the state 
accountability system on Massachusetts high school students. To put these effects in context, it is 
important to recall the evidence cited earlier. Under standards-based educational reforms, the 
average reading and mathematics performances of Massachusetts students have improved 
markedly. In 2007, the state’s reading and mathematics performances on the NAEP ranked first 
in the nation.  Thus, we do not see the evidence that we present as an attack on the demonstrably 
successful educational reform effort in Massachusetts.  Instead, we document unanticipated 
consequences of efforts to prepare all students to meet the demands of 21
st century life.  These 
consequences are important and need to be at the center of efforts to make standards-based 
reforms work for all Massachusetts students in the years ahead. 
To recap, we find that, for low-income urban students on the margin of passing, failing 
the 8
th grade mathematics examination reduces the probability of persisting to 10
th grade by three 
percentage points, while failing the 10
th grade examination reduces the probability of on-time 
graduation by eight percentage points. We find no effects of failing for wealthier urban students 
or suburban students. Again, these estimates are only valid for students at the margins of passing 
the examination, under the high-stakes testing regime in Massachusetts.  
Importantly, we know nothing about whether these students are better (or worse) off than 
they would have been in the absence of standards-based reform. However, low-income, urban 
students with essentially the same proficiency on the state test have substantially different 
graduation outcomes simply because they are categorized as “passing” or “failing” the 
examination. This effect raises an important challenge for urban school districts. We also have 
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no information about the extent to which the requirement to pass the MCAS affects the 
probability of on-time graduation for students well below the passing score. As a result, we 
cannot estimate how much of the state dropout rate for low-income urban youth is due to the 
imposition of the exit examination. However, because 60% of students who do not graduate on 
time actually pass the MCAS, failing the test is clearly only one of many factors that contribute 
to the dropout decision. 
We see several complementary explanations for the finding that failing the 10
th grade 
mathematics examination reduces the likelihood of graduation for urban students from low-
income families, but not for more affluent or suburban students. First, we cannot distinguish 
whether just failing the examination causes these students to drop out or whether just passing it 
causes them to remain in school. Low-income urban students who pass may feel encouraged that 
they are doing well in school and may decide to persist to graduation. Similarly, students who 
pass may get more teacher attention or may be promoted more readily through school, leading to 
improved graduation outcomes.  
On the other hand, low-income urban students who fail the examination may become 
discouraged or subject to institutional responses that reduce their likelihood of graduating on 
time. Families of low-income urban students may lack the resources to help them overcome the 
hurdle posed by failing the examination. Low-income urban students typically attend high 
schools in which many students have failed the 10
th grade MCAS examinations.  These schools  
are struggling to figure out how, with very limited resources, to respond to this problem.  Finally, 
the interaction between school and home contexts may produce these effects. Interestingly, the 
different consequences for failing the ELA examination than for failing the mathematics 
examination suggest that urban schools may devote more resources to or be more successful at 
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remediation in reading and writing than in mathematics. 
That suburban students, including those from low-income families, appear to face no 
barrier from failing the 10
th grade MCAS mathematics test suggests that their schools have found 
ways to support both low-income and wealthier students who have failed. These suburban 
schools typically have many fewer students who fail the examination, so they can afford to 
provide more personalized attention and remediation. In some Massachusetts districts, schools 
match teachers with students who failed the exit examination in order to provide one-on-one 
tutoring. In such an environment, it is not surprising that these students may in fact have more in-
school adult contact and encouragement than students who just passed, and may in fact graduate 
at greater rates.  
  That most students who fail the 10
th grade mathematics examination retake it and that 
low-income urban students retake the test at similar rates as their wealthier urban or suburban 
peers are also encouraging.  These findings suggest that these students are receiving the message 
that they should persist and retake the test. As a result, schools have time to work with these 
students and prepare them to meet the graduation requirements. However, low-income urban 
students are much less likely to pass this retest, even when comparing students with the same 
initial examination performance.  Finding the explanation for this pattern is an important topic 
for research, with critical implications for improving equality of educational opportunity.   
  Our findings raise several questions for researchers, educators, and policymakers in 
Massachusetts and other states.  First, the absence of effects of high-stakes testing on high school 
completion for suburban students (including those from low-income families) suggests that it is 
possible to overcome the initial disappointment associated with failing a high-stakes 
examination. Learning more about the initiatives that improve student retention could be helpful 
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for districts struggling to support many failing students. A related question that we intend to 
pursue in future work is whether some urban districts are more successful than others in 
supporting students who failed the 10
th grade mathematics examination. If that is the case, then 
understanding the successful efforts of some urban districts might help others to improve their 
support to struggling mathematics learners. 
Especially intriguing is the finding that marginally failing the high-stakes ELA 
examination does not reduce the probability that low-income urban 10
th graders graduated on 
time, while marginally failing the mathematics examination does reduce the probability of on-
time graduation.  Why the difference?  Do urban districts concentrate resources on programs to 
improve their low-income students’ ELA skills? Does the structure of the examinations make 
remediation easier in ELA than in mathematics for students on the border of passing?  
Our finding that the Fear of Failing the 10
th grade examination induces some low-income 
urban students to drop out before even taking it raises additional questions. Failing the 8
th grade 
examination gives students some sense of their probable performance on the 10
th grade test, but 
discerning students should recognize that scores on either side of the cutoff are not substantively 
different. Nonetheless, we found a moderate effect of failing on persistence to 10
th grade for 
these very students. What is the mechanism at play here? Does the “failing” label affect a 
student’s self-concept? Do students pay attention only to the performance level that their score 
puts them in, not on how close they are to passing?  Or, does this effect reflect school or parental 
responses, such as retaining students or removing them to private schools? 
Another question concerns the extent to which the consequences of exit examinations 
depend on their content and format. The 10
th grade MCAS mathematics test is relatively 
demanding compared to the exit examinations used by other states. Not only does it assess 
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students’ skills in a range of topic areas, it does so with questions that contain relatively complex 
language. Also, some test items call for open-ended responses while others require students to 
explain their answers. Supporters of the Massachusetts examinations argue that good instruction 
in mathematics is the only way to prepare students to do well on the test, and that simply drilling 
students on released test items is not an effective way to improve MCAS scores.  The payoff to 
drill, as opposed to good mathematics instruction, may vary among the examinations used by 
different states. This difference may influence the success of various remediation programs. 
This research argues for the importance of examining heterogeneous effects. In future 
work, we hope to explore more fully the effects of failing on different groups of students, 
including those with limited English proficiency. It also raises the question of whether the types 
of differential impacts we observe in Massachusetts may also be present in other states, 
especially those that use relatively demanding exit examinations. A corollary is the importance 
of finding the explanations for any observed differential effects of exit examinations. Finding 
differences in the probability of retaking the examination between groups suggests one policy 
problem. Finding differences in success rates among those who do retake the examination, as we 
do, suggests a different problem. We need to understand more carefully what messages and 
remediation efforts low-income urban students are receiving that encourage them to retake the 
examination but do not prepare them for success. Finally, we wonder why the effect for urban 
students varies by income. Do wealthier students attend different schools, or do they receive 
additional support outside of school? 
In summary, the requirement that high school students achieve passing scores on 
relatively rigorous state-administered examinations in order to obtain a high school diploma is a 
relatively new phenomenon in the United States.  The content, format, and difficulty of such tests 
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vary widely across states, as do opportunities for re-taking the examinations and support for 
those who fail. Future research needs to go beyond the question of whether failing a particular 
exit examination affects the probability of high school graduation. It needs to examine the extent 
to which the consequences of failing an exit examination depend on the attributes of the 
examination, the testing system, the student, and the quality of support available to struggling 
students.   
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Figure 1. Comparison of recent Massachusetts and nationwide National Assessment of 
Educational Progress scaled scores, for 8
th grade mathematics from 1992 to 2008. 
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Figure 2. Fitted smoothed nonparametric relationship (bandwidth=6) between the probability of 
on-time graduation and 10
th grade mathematics score for low-income urban students, with the 
sample mean probabilities of graduation overlaid. 
 
0.30
0.35
0.40
0.45
0.50
0.55
0.60
0.65
0.70
0.75
0.80
11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31
Raw MCAS Score
P
r
o
b
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
 
o
f
 
G
r
a
d
u
a
t
i
o
n
 
We plot the nonparametric regression fit without student-level covariates. 
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Figure 3.  Sample histogram presenting the frequencies of students who failed the 10
th grade 
mathematics examination and who subsequently retook the examination, along with their 
performance on retest. 
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Figure 4. Fitted relationship (from Table 2) between the probability of retaking the examination 
(top panel) or passing the first retest (bottom panel) and initial 10
th grade mathematics score for 
low-income urban students and suburban students who failed their first examination (plotted in 
the immediate region of the pass/fail cut-score for white female students not classified as special 
education or limited English proficient who just passed the ELA test) (n=8,225).  
 
0.40
0.50
0.60
0.70
0.80
0.90
1.00
10 12 14 16 18 20
Raw MCAS Math Score
P
r
o
b
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
 
o
f
 
T
a
k
i
n
g
 
R
e
t
e
s
t
 
Urban, Low-income
Suburban
 
 
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
0.50
0.60
10 12 14 16 18 20
Predicted MCAS Math Score
P
r
o
b
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
 
o
f
 
P
a
s
s
i
n
g
 
F
i
r
s
t
 
R
e
t
e
s
t
 
Urban, Low-income
Suburban
 
  38 
Figure 5. Fitted smoothed nonparametric relationship (bandwidth=6) between the probability of 
persisting to 10
th grade and 8
th grade mathematics score for low-income urban students, with the 
sample mean probabilities of graduation overlaid. 
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We plot the nonparametric regression fit without student-level covariates. 
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Figure 6. Fitted smoothed nonparametric relationship (bandwidth=8) between the probability of 
on-time high school graduation and 10
th grade ELA score for low-income urban students, with 
the sample mean probabilities of graduation overlaid. 
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We plot the nonparametric regression fit without student-level covariates. 
  40 
Table 1. Parameter estimates, standard errors, and approximate p-values at the cut score from the 
nonparametric regression analysis of the effect of failing the 10
th grade mathematics examination 
on on-time graduation (from the single regression centered at the cut score with bandwidth h*).   
 
Predictor  Urban Low-
Income 
Urban, Not 
Low-Income 
Suburban, 
Low-Income 
Suburban, 
Not Low-
Income 
Intercept  0.577*** 0.693*** 0.647*** 0.739  *** 
 (0.033)  (0.049)  (0.039)  (0.025)   
MATH  0.024*** 0.047*** 0.021*  0.025  *** 
 (0.007)  (0.012)  (0.009)  (0.007)   
PASS  0.080* -0.052  0.023  -0.015   
 (0.033)  (0.054)  (0.042)  (0.027)   
PASSxMATH  -0.031*** -0.028  -0.022  -0.015   
 (0.009)  (0.014)  (0.011)  (0.008)   
African-American  0.070** -0.003  0.103**  0.041   
 (0.022)  (0.034)  (0.032)  (0.033)   
Asian-American  0.059 0.126 0.163**  0.028   
 (0.038)  (0.076)  (0.056)  (0.061)   
Hispanic  -0.004 -0.091* 0.054*  -0.050   
 (0.022)  (0.040)  (0.025)  (0.033)   
Mixed/Other Race  0.225*** 0.008  0.151*  -0.021   
 (0.068)  (0.110)  (0.070)  (0.090)   
Native American  -0.068 -0.765***  0.244***  -0.017   
 (0.138)  (0.027)  (0.059)  (0.096)   
Pacific Islander  -0.186 0.000  -0.195 -0.475  * 
 (0.261)  .    (0.178)  (0.190)   
Limited English Proficient  0.023 -0.103 -0.029 -0.085   
 (0.024)  (0.074)  (0.043)  (0.071)   
Special Education  -0.015 0.031 0.031 0.050  *** 
 (0.020)  (0.032)  (0.022)  (0.012)   
Female  0.08*** 0.105*** 0.064**  0.08  *** 
 (0.016)  (0.025)  (0.020)  (0.012)   
New Student  -0.057* -0.058  -0.064  -0.081  *** 
 (0.024)  (0.034)  (0.033)  (0.021)   
R
2 0.043 0.072 0.028 0.035 
Bandwidth (h*)  6  6  6  6 
N 3469  1371  2172  4857 
Notes: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.  
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Table 2. Parameter estimates, standard errors, and approximate p-values from the probit 
instrumental variable regression analysis of the probability of retaking the examination and 
passing the first retest, among all students who originally failed (n=8,225). 
 
Predictor  Probability of Retaking 
Test (Probit) 
Probability of Passing 
Retest (IV Probit) 
Intercept  1.609*** 0.179* 
 (0.066)  (0.071) 
Urban*Lowinc  0.122 0.081 
 (0.065)  (0.054) 
Urban  -0.163** -0.317*** 
 (0.062)  (0.050) 
MATH  0.043*** 0.08*** 
 (0.004)  (0.007) 
ELA  0.025*** --- 
 (0.003)     
PASS (ELA)  -0.187** 0.201*** 
 (0.065)  (0.042) 
African-American 0.362***  -0.118* 
 (0.065)  (0.047) 
Asian-American  0.049 0.062 
 (0.115)  (0.092) 
Hispanic  0.071 -0.263*** 
 (0.055)  (0.044) 
Mixed/Other Race  0.854* -0.237 
 (0.349)  (0.163) 
Native American  0.546 -0.057 
 (0.383)  (0.202) 
Pacific Islander  1.148* -0.136 
 (0.533)  (0.246) 
Limited English Proficient  0.195** -0.192*** 
 (0.067)  (0.058) 
Special Education  0.288*** -0.055 
  (0.043) (0.033) 
Female  0.08* -0.068* 
  (0.040) (0.030) 
New Student  -0.353*** 0.025 
 (0.049)  (0.043) 
-2*Log Likelihood  4951  55922 
Notes: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.  
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Probability of Retaking Test  Probability of Passing Retest 
Predictor 
Probit  IV Probit  Probit  IV Probit 
Intercept  1.609*** 1.938***  -0.02  0.179  * 
 (0.066)  (0.071)  (0.051)  (0.071)   
Urban*Lowinc  0.122 0.122 0.078 0.081   
 (0.065)  (0.063)  (0.054)  (0.054)   
Urban  -0.163** -0.138*  -0.329***  -0.317  *** 
 (0.062)  (0.060)  (0.050)  (0.050)   
MATH  0.043*** 0.12***  0.043*** 0.08  *** 
 (0.004)  (0.006)  (0.004)  (0.007)   
ELA  0.025*** ---  0.011*** ---   
 (0.003)      (0.002)     
PASS (ELA)  -0.187** -0.04  0.137** 0.201  *** 
 (0.065)  (0.053)  (0.051)  (0.042)   
African-American 0.362***  0.312***  -0.106*  -0.118  * 
 (0.065)  (0.062)  (0.047)  (0.047)   
Asian-American  0.049 0.049 0.061 0.062   
 (0.115)  (0.111)  (0.092)  (0.092)   
Hispanic  0.071 0.049  -0.257***  -0.263  *** 
 (0.055)  (0.053)  (0.045)  (0.044)   
Mixed/Other Race  0.854* 0.798*  -0.235  -0.237   
 (0.349)  (0.332)  (0.164)  (0.163)   
Native American  0.546 0.479  -0.04 -0.057   
 (0.383)  (0.366)  (0.203)  (0.202)   
Pacific Islander  1.148* 1.195*  -0.19  -0.136   
 (0.533)  (0.507)  (0.248)  (0.246)   
Limited English Proficient  0.195** 0.101  -0.155** -0.192  *** 
 (0.067)  (0.064)  (0.059)  (0.058)   
Special Education  0.288*** 0.281***  -0.059  -0.055   
 (0.043)  (0.042)  (0.033)  (0.033)   
Female  0.08* 0.1**  -0.081**  -0.068  * 
 (0.040)  (0.039)  (0.031)  (0.030)   
New Student  -0.353*** -0.318***  0.018  0.025   
 (0.049)  (0.048)  (0.043)  (0.043)   
-2*Log Likelihood  4951  9291  51582  55922 
Notes: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.  
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Table 3. Parameter estimates, standard errors, and approximate p-values at the cut score from the 
nonparametric regression analysis of the effect of failing the 8
th grade mathematics examination 
on persistence to 10
th grade (from the single regression centered at the cut score with bandwidth 
h*). 
Predictor  Urban Low-
Income 
Urban, Not 
Low-Income 
Suburban, 
Low-Income 
Suburban, 
Not Low-
Income 
Intercept  0.796*** 0.815*** 0.886*** 0.940  *** 
 (0.019)  (0.025)  (0.018)  (0.008)   
MATH (8
th Grade)  0.012** -0.001  0.008  0.006  ** 
 (0.004)  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.002)   
PASS (8
th Grade)  0.027 0.048  -0.002 -0.008   
 (0.019)  (0.028)  (0.020)  (0.009)   
PASSxMATH  -0.010 0.001  -0.003 -0.002   
 (0.005)  (0.008)  (0.005)  (0.002)   
African-American  0.078*** -0.080***  0.026  -0.030   
 (0.013)  (0.023)  (0.017)  (0.017)   
Asian-American  0.049** -0.028  0.030  -0.035   
 (0.019)  (0.047)  (0.028)  (0.024)   
Hispanic  0.028* -0.051*  0.014  -0.054  ** 
 (0.013)  (0.024)  (0.014)  (0.018)   
Mixed/Other Race  0.189*** 0.110*** 0.111*** 0.049  *** 
 (0.011)  (0.030)  (0.008)  (0.012)   
Native American  -0.145 0.032 0.098***  -0.040   
 (0.110)  (0.114)  (0.008)  (0.068)   
Pacific Islander  -0.021 0.138***  -0.060 0.063  *** 
 (0.132)  (0.018)  (0.117)  (0.005)   
Limited English Proficient  0.007 -0.223***  -0.055 -0.082   
 (0.017)  (0.066)  (0.040)  (0.064)   
Special Education  0.000 -0.009  0.010  0.005   
 (0.015)  (0.021)  (0.012)  (0.005)   
Female  0.029** 0.035*  0.023*  0.011  * 
 (0.010)  (0.014)  (0.010)  (0.004)   
R
2 0.023 0.025 0.011 0.006 
Bandwidth (h*)  6  6  6  6 
N 5709  2828  3759  13160 
Notes: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.  
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Table 4. Parameter estimates, standard errors, and approximate p-values at the cut score from the 
nonparametric regression analysis of the effect of failing the 10
th grade ELA examination on on-
time graduation (from the single regression centered at the cut score with bandwidth h*). 
Predictor  Urban Low-
Income 
Urban, Not 
Low-Income 
Suburban, 
Low-Income 
Suburban, 
Not Low-
Income 
Intercept  0.519*** 0.617*** 0.641*** 0.716  *** 
 (0.034)  (0.059)  (0.042)  (0.031)   
ELA  0.018** 0.035** 0.022*  0.021  ** 
 (0.006)  (0.013)  (0.009)  (0.007)   
PASS  0.011 -0.052 -0.016  0.022   
 (0.034)  (0.067)  (0.044)  (0.033)   
PASSxELA  -0.005 -0.009 -0.015 -0.011   
 (0.007)  (0.014)  (0.010)  (0.008)   
African-American  0.059** -0.020  0.107*** 0.069  * 
 (0.022)  (0.037)  (0.030)  (0.033)   
Asian-American  0.123*** 0.033  0.205*** 0.100  * 
 (0.030)  (0.065)  (0.037)  (0.045)   
Hispanic  0.015 -0.091* 0.040 -0.059   
 (0.022)  (0.042)  (0.025)  (0.036)   
Mixed/Other Race  0.121 -0.058  0.204***  0.168  *** 
 (0.079)  (0.139)  (0.056)  (0.046)   
Native American  0.059 0.306***  0.356***  0.088   
 (0.152)  (0.077)  (0.031)  (0.075)   
Pacific Islander  -0.183 ---  -0.402  -0.244   
 (0.199)      (0.225)  (0.176)   
Limited English Proficient  0.102*** -0.098  0.080*  -0.004   
 (0.021)  (0.069)  (0.036)  (0.063)   
Special Education  0.021 0.021 0.042*  0.029  * 
 (0.019)  (0.033)  (0.021)  (0.013)   
Female  0.049** 0.080** 0.058** 0.055  *** 
 (0.016)  (0.027)  (0.019)  (0.012)   
New Student  0.004 -0.031 -0.064*  -0.124  *** 
 (0.018)  (0.032)  (0.025)  (0.018)   
R
2 0.039 0.081 0.040 0.046 
Bandwidth (h*)  8  8  8  8 
N 3820  1180  2281  4449 
Notes: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.  
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Table 5.  Estimated causal impacts of failing the 10
th grade mathematics, 8
th grade mathematics, 
and 10
th grade ELA examinations, for different bandwidths by subgroup, with standard errors in 
parentheses. Results for the optimal bandwidth, h*, appear in bold. 
Panel I: 10
th Grade Mathematics 
  Bandwidth (h)
Group 4  5  6  7  8 
Urban, Low Income  0.131**  0.103**  0.080* 0.065  * 0.058* 
 (0.041)  (0.036)  (0.033) (0.031)   (0.029) 
Urban, Not Low Income  -0.025  -0.024  -0.052 -0.007   -0.007 
 (0.067)  (0.059)  (0.054) (0.050)   (0.046) 
Suburban, Low Income  -0.050  -0.022  0.023 0.009   0.003 
 (0.052)  (0.045)  (0.042) (0.038)   (0.036) 
Suburban, Not Low Income  0.000  -0.018  -0.015 -0.016   -0.027 
 (0.034)  (0.030)  (0.027) (0.025)   (0.024) 
Panel II: 8
th Grade Mathematics 
  Bandwidth (h)
Group 4  5  6  7  8 
Urban, Low Income  0.032 0.029 0.027 0.037  *  0.034* 
  (0.024) (0.021) (0.019) (0.018)   (0.017) 
Urban, Not Low Income  0.047 0.027 0.048 0.029   0.013 
  (0.036) (0.031) (0.028) (0.026)   (0.025) 
Suburban, Low Income  0.011 0.012  -0.002 0.008   0.014 
  (0.024) (0.022) (0.020) (0.018)   (0.017) 
Suburban, Not Low Income  -0.008 -0.003 -0.008 -0.010   -0.013 
  (0.011) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008)   (0.008) 
Panel III: 10
th Grade ELA 
  Bandwidth (h)
Group 6  7  8  9  10 
Urban, Low Income  -0.002 0.006 0.011 0.019   0.010 
  (0.039) (0.036) (0.034) (0.032)   (0.030) 
Urban, Not Low Income  -0.121 -0.090 -0.052 -0.023    0.023 
  (0.076) (0.072) (0.067) (0.063)   (0.060) 
Suburban, Low Income  -0.046 -0.031 -0.016 0.003   0.006 
  (0.052) (0.048) (0.044) (0.042)   (0.007) 
Suburban, Not Low Income  -0.017 -0.001  0.022 0.027   0.032 
  (0.038) (0.035) (0.033) (0.031)   (0.030) 
Notes: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.  
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Table 6. Estimated causal impact of failing the 10
th grade mathematics examination on on-time 
high school graduation from a logistic regression model, for samples within windows of different 
widths around the cut score. Panel I presents the estimated logistic regression coefficients, with 
standard errors in parentheses; Panel II presents the fitted differences in the probability of 
graduation for a typical student. Results for the optimal bandwidth, h*, appear in bold 
 
Panel I: Logistic regression coefficients (standard errors in parentheses) 
  Width of window around discontinuity
Group  +/- 4  +/- 5  +/- 6  +/- 7  +/- 8 
Urban, Low Income  0.596** 0.473** 0.378* 0.307  * 0.277* 
  (0.182) (0.160) (0.147) (0.135)   (0.127) 
Urban, Not Low Income  -0.111 -0.113 -0.231 -0.024   -0.028 
  (0.308) (0.269) (0.249) (0.229)   (0.213) 
Suburban, Low Income  -0.222 -0.084  0.133 0.061   0.030 
  (0.253) (0.221) (0.200) (0.183)   (0.171) 
Suburban, Not Low Income  0.002 -0.101 -0.062 -0.066   -0.114 
  (0.186) (0.166) (0.150) (0.140)   (0.131) 
Panel II: Probability of graduation 
  Width of window around discontinuity
Group  +/- 4  +/- 5  +/- 6  +/- 7  +/- 8 
Urban, Low Income  0.127** 0.101** 0.079*  0.065 *  0.058* 
          
Urban, Not Low Income  -0.025 -0.022 -0.041  -0.005   -0.005 
          
Suburban, Low Income  -0.041 -0.016  0.027  0.012   0.006 
          
Suburban, Not Low Income  0.000 -0.016 -0.010  -0.010   -0.017 
          
The “typical” student in the regression discontinuity sample is a white female, not classified as either LEP or as 
special education.  
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Table 7. Parameter estimates, standard errors, and approximate p-values at the cut score from the 
nonparametric regression analysis of the effect of failing the 10
th grade mathematics examination 
on three different graduation outcomes, for urban, low-income students (from the single 
regression centered at the cut score with bandwidth h*).   
Predictor  Graduated or still 
enrolled  Dropped Out  Graduated or 
earned GED 
Intercept  0.660*** 0.273***  0.607  *** 
 (0.031)  (0.027)  (0.033)   
MATH  0.015* 0.002  0.025  *** 
 (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.007)   
PASS  0.091** -0.072**  0.081  * 
 (0.030)  (0.026)  (0.033)   
PASSxMATH  -0.024** 0.001  -0.031  *** 
 (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.009)   
African-American  0.117*** -0.089***  0.059  ** 
 (0.020)  (0.017)  (0.022)   
Asian-American  0.081* -0.067*  0.061   
 (0.035)  (0.030)  (0.038)   
Hispanic  0.039 -0.054** -0.011   
 (0.021)  (0.018)  (0.021)   
Mixed/Other Race  0.241*** -0.152***  0.204  ** 
 (0.054)  (0.044)  (0.068)   
Native American  -0.081 -0.139  -0.086   
 (0.135)  (0.072)  (0.138)   
Pacific Islander  0.145 -0.015  -0.208   
 (0.201)  (0.189)  (0.261)   
Limited English Proficient  0.027 -0.020  0.007   
 (0.022)  (0.018)  (0.024)   
Special Education  -0.003 -0.012  -0.028   
 (0.019)  (0.016)  (0.020)   
Female  0.031* -0.039**  0.073  *** 
 (0.015)  (0.012)  (0.016)   
New Student  -0.071** 0.003  -0.050  * 
 (0.023)  (0.018)  (0.024)   
R
2 0.036 0.018 0.045 
Bandwidth  (h*)  6 6 6 
N 3469  3469  3469 
Notes: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.  
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Appendix A 
 
To explore the extent to which measurement error may affect OLS estimates of retest success by 
subgroup and whether IV estimates remove this source of bias, we ran a simulation designed to 
mirror our analyses. Here, we simulated mathematics, ELA, and mathematics retest scores for 
two groups of students: suburban and urban, low income. Using sample data and published 
reliabilities, we derived estimates of the true score means, true score covariance matrices, and 
error variances on each of the tests.  
  
Using these estimates, we drew true scores on both the “math” and “ELA” tests for 10,630 ULI 
students and 49,378 suburban students from a multivariate normal distribution with the sample 
true covariance matrix. We then drew three sets of mean zero errors – two for math and one for 
ELA, using the appropriate error variances. We added the appropriate errors to the true scores to 
obtain mathematics “test” and “retest” scores and ELA “test” scores for each observation. We 
iterated this process, drawing 10,000 different samples.  
 
Our simulation results confirm that truncating the sample to include only students who fail does 
produce mechanical differences in retest success. We find that the average urban, low-income 
students who fails the first mathematics test scores 3 points lower on their retest than suburban 
students who fail. Comparing students with the same initial test scores near the cutoff, low-
income urban students are six to seven percentage points less likely to pass the retest than 
similarly able suburban students. OLS regression reveals a statistically significant relationship 
between retest score and urban, low-income status in 99.8% of cases. Again, these differences 
arose mechanically, without any changes in the underlying true score distribution. 
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Hanushek & Rivkin (2006) suggest that using another test score to instrument for the initial 
mathematics test can resolve this problem. Here, we use the “ELA” test as an instrument for the 
mathematics test. We implement this approach with two-stage least squares in each of the 10,000 
datasets constructed above. We find a statistically significant relationship (with α=0.05) between 
retest score and urban, low-income status in just 4.8% of the samples, within the tolerance that 
we could expect by chance. Thus, the simulation appears to confirm that the IV approach 
resolves this issue. 
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